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 1 
Can there be a global demos? An agency-based approach 
Christian List and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi∗ 
This version: 24 September 2009 
The world is increasingly characterized by transnational interdependence, cross-border 
policy externalities and the widely perceived need to provide certain global collective 
goods and to avoid global collective bads. Consider, for example, the problem of climate 
change and the need to limit greenhouse gas emissions; the problem of global refugee 
flows and the commitment to protect the human rights of forced migrants; and the 
problem of controlling and eradicating infectious diseases that can spread very fast, such 
as new forms of influenza. In all these cases, the need for “global governance”, that is, 
the challenge to make good collective decisions and to coordinate actions transnationally, 
is more pressing than ever. There are at least two dimensions of this challenge. First, 
global public goods are typically underprovided, and global public bads over-occur, in 
part because there are too few mechanisms to prevent free-riding at the global level (the 
“efficiency dimension”).1 And second, where global public goods are provided, and 
global public bads avoided, this is often the result of bargaining based on differential 
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 See, e.g., Todd Sandler, Global collective action (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004) and Scott Barrett, Why cooperate? The incentive to supply global public goods (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). We use the term public goods broadly to include common pool resources. 
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power and resources rather than the product of a process generally perceived as 
legitimate (the “legitimacy dimension”).2 
Similar challenges arise in national contexts too, but there they are usually met through 
well-established institutions with enforcing powers and democratic mechanisms for 
burden-sharing based on widely held norms of distributive justice. The former ensure 
efficiency, the latter legitimacy. There is no shortage of proposals for institutional designs 
that might perform similar functions at the global level, but it is often held that such 
institutions would be unlikely to be established and that, even if they were established, 
they would not function properly. In particular, it is said, they would lack the required 
social basis that supports equivalent institutions at the national level. What is missing at 
the global level, so the argument goes, is a “demos”.3  
On this picture, the lack of a global demos hinders good global governance, that is, 
successful global collective decision-making and coordinated action. Conversely, if a 
global demos existed, it would facilitate efficient and legitimate global governance, for 
instance by promoting the emergence of supranational institutions or by shaping the 
policies of national ones. But what is actually meant by a “global demos”? The notion of 
a demos, let alone that of a global one, is less well established than other political notions 
such as the notion of a state, and so a careful conceptual analysis is needed.4 And could a 
global demos – assuming it has been defined properly – ever come into existence and 
succeed at facilitating good global governance, as has been suggested? This paper seeks 
to offer a new theoretical perspective on these questions. 
                                                 
2
 See, e.g., Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 2002) and David Held, 
“Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective,” in Global 
governance and public accountability, ed. David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2005), pp. 240-267. 
3
 In a related vein, J. H. H. Weiler coined the phrase “no-demos thesis” in relation to the European Union 
and its post-Maastricht predicament. See J. H. H. Weiler, “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, 
Telos and the German Maastricht Decision,” European Law Journal 1(3) (1995): 219-258. 
4
 See, however, David Miller’s recent paper, “Democracy’s Domain,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37(3) 
(2009): 201-228, which came to our attention after we completed the present paper. We briefly compare 
Miller’s interesting analysis with ours in a later note. 
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The current debate about the global demos is divided between two opposing camps, 
which differ on both conceptual and empirical levels. On the one hand, there are the 
“pessimist” or “impossibilist” views, according to which the emergence of a global 
demos is either conceptually or empirically impossible. On the conceptual version of this 
view, the very notion of a global demos is incoherent, while on the empirical one we are 
faced with a vicious circle in which the absence of a global demos both leads to, and is 
reinforced by, the absence of successful institutions for global governance. On the other 
hand, there are the “optimist” or “possibilist” views, according to which the emergence of 
a global demos is conceptually as well as empirically possible and an embryonic version 
of it already exists. On this view, there exists a virtuous circle in which existing global 
institutions promote the development of a global demos, which in turn can strengthen 
global institutions. However, since the two camps agree neither on a common working 
definition of a global demos, nor on the relevant empirical facts, it is difficult to reconcile 
their conflicting outlooks. 
Our aim is to move the debate beyond its current stalemate. We argue that existing 
conceptions of a demos are ill-suited for capturing precisely what kind of a global demos 
is needed in order to facilitate good global governance, and we propose a new conception 
of a demos that is better suited for this purpose. In particular, we suggest that some of the 
most prominent conceptions of a demos have focused too much on the question of who 
the members of a demos are and too little on the question of what functional 
characteristics it must have in order to perform its role in facilitating governance within 
the relevant domain. Our new proposal shifts the emphasis from the first, 
“compositional” question to the second, “performative” one, and thereby provides a more 
“agency-based” account of a global demos. The key criterion that a collection of 
individuals must meet in order to qualify as a demos, we suggest, is that it is not merely 
demarcated by an appropriate membership criterion, but that it can be organized, in a 
democratic manner, so as to function as a state-like agent, as explained in the course of 
our argument. Compared to the existing, predominantly “compositional” approaches to 
thinking about the demos, this agency-based approach puts us into a much better position 
to assess the empirical prospects for the emergence of a global demos that can facilitate 
good global governance. 
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The paper is structured as follows. In section I, we introduce two approaches to 
conceptualizing a “demos”, the “compositional” and the “performative” ones, and argue 
that the compositional approach alone is insufficient for capturing the role a demos is 
supposed to play in facilitating governance. In section II, we propose and defend our 
own, “agency-based” approach, which focuses on the performative dimension of the 
demos but keeps lessons from the compositional approach on board. In section III, we 
offer a first operationalization of this approach, so as to allow for diachronic and global-
national comparisons. However, we present this operationalization only as a tentative 
approximation, in the hope that it will inspire more extensive research. In order to show 
that a global demos is in principle possible under our agency-based conception, we 
devote section IV to an illustrative case study of how the emergence of a global demos 
might be promoted through some forms of transnational deliberation. Section V, finally, 
contains some concluding remarks. 
Our paper builds on ideas from several different fields, including international political 
theory,5 the theory of group agency,6 and theories of deliberation and social choice.7 
Although many of the elements of our approach are well established in those fields, the 
novelty of our approach lies in the particular way in which these elements are put 
together so as to illuminate the notion of a global demos. 
                                                 
5
 E.g., Terry Macdonald, “Boundaries Beyond Borders: Delineating Democratic ‘Peoples’ in a Globalizing 
World,” Democratization 10(3) (2003): 173-194; Thomas Christiano, “A Democratic Theory of Territory 
and Some Puzzles about Global Democracy,” Journal of Social Philosophy 37(1) (2006): 81-107; and 
Robert E. Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 35(1) (2007): 40-68. 
6
 Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design and Status of Corporate Agents 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
7
 E.g., David Miller, “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice,” Political Studies 40(special issue) 
(1992): 54-67; Jack Knight and James Johnson, “Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of 
Democratic Legitimacy,” Political Theory 22 (1994): 277-296; John Dryzek and Christian List, “Social 
Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation,” British Journal of Political Science 33 
(2003): 1-28; and Christian List, Robert Luskin, James Fishkin and Iain McLean, “Deliberation, Single-
Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls,” working 
paper, London School of Economics and Stanford Center for Deliberative Democracy (2000/2007). 
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I. TWO APPROACHES TO CONCEPTUALIZING A DEMOS 
What is a demos? Or more precisely, what is a demos in relation to a particular set of 
issues or policy area? Adapting a distinction used in the theory of group agency, we can 
distinguish between two ways of approaching this question.8 We can either ask who a 
demos is composed of, that is, what its membership criterion is. Call this the 
“compositional” approach. Or we can ask what functional characteristics it must have in 
order to perform its role in guiding decisions in relation to the given set of issues or 
policy area. Call this the “performative” approach.  
In what follows we begin with a discussion of the compositional approach, which has 
been the dominant one in existing debates on the idea of a global demos. We distinguish 
two variants of the approach, but find both of them unsatisfactory. Firstly, it is difficult to 
adjudicate which variant is the correct one, and, secondly and more importantly, in either 
variant the approach leaves open the question of whether a demos as defined by it can 
achieve what it is supposed to do, namely to facilitate governance, that is, decision-
making and action-taking. This leads us to the performative approach. While its two most 
established variants exhibit some crucial limitations, it provides useful insights for the 
development of our own, “agency-based” approach in the subsequent section. 
The compositional approach 
As we have noted, the compositional approach defines the demos for a particular set of 
issues by providing a membership criterion.9 The identification of such a criterion has 
been the central goal in the debate on the so-called “boundary problem”.10 There are two 
                                                 
8
 Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency (op. cit.). 
9
 As discussed below, on some accounts it only ever makes sense to define the demos in relation to the all-
encompassing set of all issues, while on other accounts there can be issue-specific demoi. 
10
 E.g., Robert A. Dahl, After the revolution? Authority in a good society (New Haven, London: Yale 
University Press, 1970); Frederick G. Whelan, “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” 
in Nomos XXV: Liberal Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1983); Macdonald, 
“Boundaries Beyond Borders” (op. cit.); Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests” (op. cit.); Miller, 
“Democracy’s Domain” (op. cit.). 
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main rival criteria in the literature.11 One is the “affectedness criterion”, according to 
which all those (potentially) affected by decisions on the given issues are entitled to take 
part in those decisions and should therefore be members of the demos.12 The other is the 
“affectivity criterion”, according to which the demos is defined by underlying cultural 
commonalities and a shared identity, at least with regard to the given issues. Often those 
commonalities and identity are defined in terms of nationality, since – as argued, for 
instance, by Will Kymlicka – “territorialized linguistic/national political units provide the 
best and perhaps the only sort of forum for genuinely participatory and deliberative 
politics”.13 But this focus on nationality is conceptually distinct from, and not implied by, 
the claim that underlying commonalities and a shared identity provide the criterion of 
membership in a demos.14 
                                                 
11
 In fact, both criteria have a number of different variants, but we set the details aside here. A third 
approach – whereby the demos is defined as the set of those individuals that happen to be nationals of a 
state that is governed democratically – is not relevant here. 
12
 The sentence “Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur” was first used in a constitutional rather than 
private law sense in the 13th century, most famously in the writ by King Edward I of England that 
summoned the bishops and abbots to the so-called Model Parliament of 1295. See Brian Tierney, “Freedom 
and the Medieval Church,” in The Origins of Modern Freedom in the West, ed. R. W. Davies (Stanford: 
Standford University Press, 1995), pp. 86-88.  
13
 Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 324. 
14
 In his recent paper, “Democracy’s Domain” (op. cit.), David Miller has made the interesting suggestion 
that the difference between two approaches to delimiting the demos – one that stresses the inclusion of all 
affected interests and another that stresses the role of sympathetic identification, underlying agreement on 
ethical principles, interpersonal trust, and stable relationships – derives at least in part from a deeper 
difference between a “liberal” and a “radical” conception of democracy. Miller argues that liberal 
democrats, for whom democracy is mainly instrumentally valuable, tend to look favourably on the principle 
of affected interest. By contrast, radical democrats, for whom democracy is principally intrinsically 
valuable, tend to emphasize sympathetic identification, underlying agreement on ethical principles, 
interpersonal trust, and the existence of stable relationships as delimitation criteria for the demos. Miller 
suggests that the latter factors are privileged by radical democrats because they are “qualities that a group 
of people must possess in order to function as a demos” (pp. 207-208). At first sight, this may seem to 
suggest that radical democrats are more interested in the “proper functioning” of the demos than liberal 
democrats are, and thus that the former lean more towards what we call the “performative” approach to 
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From a conceptual perspective, neither membership criterion as just defined, affectedness 
or affectivity, rules out the possibility of an issue-specific demos. For example, several of 
us may be affected by decisions regarding the city of London and thereby qualify as 
fellow Londoners, but not by decisions regarding a particular local project, say at our 
university, and thereby fail to qualify as fellow members of the relevant, more local 
demos. Similarly, we could all have a shared identity qua being Londoners, which does 
not extend to issues that have nothing to do with London, and so we might belong to 
different “demoi” in relation to those other social, religious or cultural issues. Thus, on 
both membership criteria, demoi can in principle be issue-specific. However, one might 
also amend each criterion with a further requirement that, in order to belong to the same 
demos, people must exhibit a shared affectedness across multiple issues, or a shared 
identity in some overarching, privileged respect, not just one restricted to a narrow set of 
issues.15 With such an amendment, a demos would always have to be defined in relation 
to a broader, perhaps all-encompassing set of issues.16 
Whether we use affectedness or affectivity for defining the membership of a demos 
makes a real difference. Given the empirical fact of significant cross-border externalities 
of a large number of policy decisions, the first criterion would point towards a very 
inclusive, possibly even global demos for many policy areas. If one accepts that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
conceptualizing the demos, while the latter lean more towards the “compositional” one. However, we 
would resist this suggestion. Precisely because liberal democrats focus on the ability of democracy to 
produce desirable outcomes such as a larger aggregate social welfare, they have no less interest in its 
proper functioning than radical democrats. For this reason, we think that it is more appropriate to maintain 
that every democrat takes (or should take) an interest in securing the existence of a well-functioning demos, 
but also that such functioning can be conceptualized in a number of different and potentially contrasting 
ways. The bulk of our paper deals with the task of providing a more precise and operationalizable 
interpretation of the idea of functioning, in the context of what we call an “agency-based” approach to 
conceptualizing the demos. 
15
 Indeed, many proponents of the affectivity criterion hold that, in reality, a demos requires one level of 
identity to take priority over others (that is, there cannot be multiple issue-specific demoi). 
16
 In “A Democratic Theory of Territory” (op. cit.), Thomas Christiano argues that democratic boundaries 
should be drawn around “common worlds”. For a group of individuals, a common world is “a world in 
which all or nearly all the individuals’ fundamental interests are intertwined with each other” (p. 97). 
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demos is in principle unbounded,17 then a global demos is normatively justified by the 
conjunction of the affectedness criterion and the empirical fact that “[t]he growth of 
transboundary problems creates […] ‘overlapping communities of fate’; that is, a state of 
affairs in which the fortune and prospects of individual political communities are 
increasingly bound together”, as noted by David Held and Anthony McGrew.18 Robert 
Goodin has elaborated on the globalizing implications of the affectedness criterion and 
discussed ways to attenuate its impact.19  
The affectivity criterion, by contrast, usually implies a bounded demos, at least under 
present empirical conditions.20 As Kymlicka observes in his critique of Held’s 
cosmopolitanism, “what determines the boundaries of a ‘community of fate’ is not the 
forces people are subjected to, but rather how they respond to those forces, and, in 
particular, what sorts of collectivities they identify with when responding to those forces. 
People belong to the same community of fate if they care about each other’s fate, and 
want to share each other’s fate”.21  
Given the affectedness and affectivity criteria alone, then, it is not clear how to demarcate 
the demos in many circumstances. Consider the common case in which the set of 
individuals potentially affected by a decision is much wider than the set sharing affective 
bonds and identities. Faced with this kind of incongruence, proponents of the 
                                                 
17
 See, for example, Arash Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally 
Control Your Own Borders,” Political Theory 36 (2008): 37-65. 
18
 David Held and Anthony McGrew, “The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the Prospects for 
World Order,” Review of International Studies 24(5) (1998): 219-245, at p. 237. 
19
 Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests” (op. cit.). On the all-inclusiveness criterion, see, further, 
Raffaele Marchetti, Global Democracy: For and Against (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). 
20
 David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), pp. 81-96. 
21
 Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular (op. cit.), pp. 319-320. Goodin, in “Enfranchising All Affected 
Interests” (op. cit.), retorts: “It is arbitrary, from a moral point of view, to whom we happen to feel 
sentimentally attached or with whom we happen to share a common history or ancestry. What makes those 
factors matter, in ways that justify constituting our demoi around them, is the way that those factors lead to 
people’s interests being intertwined. […] The reason we think that territorial or historical or national groups 
ought make decisions together is that, typically if not invariably, the interests of individuals within those 
groups are affected by the actions and choices of others in that group” (p. 48). 
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affectedness criterion would hope that common experiences will promote a we-feeling 
and would support policies that intentionally further its development. The active 
promotion of such feelings and the pursuit of appropriate policies can be described as 
“identity-expanding strategies”. Proponents of the affectivity criterion, by contrast, would 
favour policies that limit or reduce the ways in which decisions taken within one 
community affect the interests of others, for instance by strengthening state sovereignty 
and limiting economic interdependence. Such attempts to reduce the number of people 
affected by certain decisions can be described as “externality-limiting strategies”.22 But 
neither the identity-expanding strategies nor the externality-limiting ones will always be 
successful when there is an incongruence between affectedness and affectivity. Identities 
cannot always be molded and externalities are often hard to contain.  
However, even if we were able to adjudicate between the two criteria in cases of conflict, 
there would be no guarantee that the collection of individuals picked out by a given 
criterion will be able to perform the role of guiding decisions and coordinating actions on 
the relevant set of issues. It is possible, for example, that the set of all people potentially 
affected by a particular decision exhibits so much internal discord and disagreement that 
it can deliver no policy guidance whatsoever. Similarly, sharing a common identity and 
exhibiting some affective bonds is not the same as being able to generate a coherent 
collective stance on the issues in question, on which policy decisions can be based and 
enacted.  
In short, if we try to define the demos in terms of a membership criterion alone, it is not 
guaranteed that the resulting “demos” can support “kratos”, the second and equally 
important etymological component of “democracy”. We also need to look at the demos’s 
performance in facilitating governance. 
                                                 
22
 Macdonald, in “Boundaries Beyond Borders” (op. cit.), develops a similar argument about how different 
approaches mandate either the “alignment” of boundaries of power to the boundaries of legitimate 
solidaristic peoples or vice versa, although we would not describe the contrast as one between “idealist” 
and “realist” approaches (pp. 178-179). On the tension between “inclusionary push” and “exclusionary 
pull”, see also Miller, “Democracy’s Domain” (op. cit.). 
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The performative approach 
The performative approach defines the demos not in terms of a membership criterion but 
in terms of the functional characteristics it must have in order to perform its role in 
guiding decisions and enabling actions on the given set of issues. As in the case of the 
compositional approach, we can extract two main variants from the literature.  
On one variant, which we call the “populist” one, a collection of people counts as a 
demos if it can be said to have a general will.23 Although this idea can be fleshed out in a 
number of ways, at a minimum it requires that it make sense, from the perspective of an 
impartial but well-informed observer, to ascribe coherent collective preferences to the 
collection. On another variant, which we call the “discursive” one,24 the mark of a demos 
is not the presence of a coherent general will, but rather the interconnectedness of its 
members in a sufficiently closely knit network of communicative interactions or 
“discourses”. The details of this idea can be variously spelt out, but what matters is a 
certain kind of internal “cohesion” among the members. This cohesion need not preclude 
diversity among them – in fact, some of the most prominent demoi in the world exhibit 
significant internal pluralism – but it does require participation and interaction within a 
shared public sphere. 
Despite capturing some key prerequisites for democratic governance, both variants of the 
performative approach have their shortcomings. The populist variant, by focusing on 
whether a general will can be coherently ascribed to a given group, runs the risk of not 
                                                 
23
 The use of the term “populist” here is inspired by William Riker, Liberalism Against Populism (San 
Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982). 
24
 Inspired by Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des 
demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), pp. 364-366. See also Nancy Fraser, 
“Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-
Westphalian World,” Theory, Culture & Society 24(4) (2007): 7-30; John S. Dryzek, Deliberative global 
politics: discourse and democracy in a divided world (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); Jürgen Habermas, 
“Kommunikative Rationalität und grenzüberschreitende Politik: eine Replik,” in Anarchie der 
kommunikativen Freiheit: Jürgen Habermas und die Theorie der internationalen Politik, ed. P. Niesen and 
B. Herborth (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2007); and Patrizia Nanz, Europolis: Constitutional Patriotism 
Beyond the Nation-State (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006). 
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paying enough attention to the group’s internal structure, particularly its internal 
diversity. The mere fact that a group, when looked at impartially from the outside, 
appears to have a “general will” is entirely consistent with the lack of any internal 
cohesion required for successfully implementing collective decisions on that basis. 
Although an extreme populist might try to explain this away by claiming that, in such 
cases of destructive internal disunity, a part of the group is “in error” over what its will is 
or how to enact it, the weakness of defining the demos in populist terms is its lack of 
sociological sophistication. 
The discursive variant of the performative approach, by contrast, is more nuanced with 
respect to social details: It focuses precisely on the networks of interactions and systems 
of discourses present within a group. Its weakness, however, lies in its insufficient focus 
on the criteria for determining what the group as a whole wants or even on whether there 
exists a coherent answer to this question. If the demos is to play a central role in 
facilitating good governance – or, expressed more bluntly, if policies are to be guided by 
“what the demos wants” – then the possession of coherent collective preferences is 
crucially important. Recall that this is exactly the insight underlying the populist 
approach, where it is expressed, however, in a way that is too detached from the social 
basis underlying the ascribed collective will. 
It seems, then, that both the populist and the discursive variants of the performative 
approach are onto something correct, but they each get only part of the picture right. The 
main insight of the populist variant is that, for a set of individuals to function as a demos, 
it must be possible to ascribe coherent attitudes to it, at least on the issues on which the 
demos is to guide and legitimize policies and actions. And the main insight of the 
discursive variant is that, in order to function as a demos, a set of individuals must exhibit 
sufficient internal cohesion to allow the successful implementation of those policies and 
actions. Our proposal in the next section builds on both of these insights, while also 
keeping the earlier, compositional question about the demos in sight. 
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II. AN AGENCY-BASED APPROACH 
What we can learn from contrasting the compositional and performative approaches is 
that there are two genuinely distinct questions about a demos:   
The compositional question: Which collection(s) of individuals should be 
considered as candidate(s) for a demos for a given policy area or set of issues? In 
particular, what membership criterion should be employed for specifying such a 
collection?  
The performative question: For any such collection of individuals, what 
functional characteristics must it exhibit in order to guide collective decision-
making and to enable coordinated actions on the given set of issues? 
Although these two questions are obviously related to each other – for example, some 
membership criteria may fail to specify collections that could possibly function well on 
the performative dimension – they should not be confused with each other, and in our 
view a satisfactory account of the demos must address both of them.25  
The first, compositional question is, to a large extent, a normative question. Principles 
specifying who should be included in any given collective decision process are normative 
principles of democracy, and although certain consequentialist or efficiency standards 
may guide our choice of those principles, this fact makes that choice no less normative. 
(Of course, once we have identified an appropriate normative criterion of membership, 
the question of which collection(s) of individuals the criterion picks out becomes a 
descriptive one, and hence empirical considerations will still play a role in identifying 
sets of people that are possible candidates for demoi.) Our personal view is that, on 
affectedness grounds, we have good reasons to consider all of humanity a possible 
candidate for a demos, at least with regard to issues of global reach, but there can still be 
                                                 
25
 It is entirely conceivable, of course, that there are correlations between certain compositional criteria and 
certain performative ones, in that groups satisfying the one set of criteria may also be likely to satisfy the 
other. However, such correlations are a contingent matter and do not undermine the fact that, conceptually, 
the compositional and performative questions about the demos are distinct. 
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reasonable disagreement on this question, especially if affectivity as well as affectedness 
is assumed to matter. 
So let us turn to the second, performative question. Once our normative membership 
criterion, together with some empirical information about who meets that criterion, has 
led us to focus on a particular collection of individuals – be it humanity as a whole, or the 
population of some territory – it becomes largely a positive, social-scientific question as 
to whether that collection can actually perform the role expected of a demos. Or at least it 
becomes such a question once we have specified what exactly that role requires, namely 
to guide collective decision making and to facilitate coordinated action. There will still be 
a normative element in giving the details of this requirement; later we look at a concrete 
operationalization.  
Highly divided societies, for example, may sometimes fail on this performative count, at 
least temporarily. However normatively desirable it may have seemed, for instance, to 
expect the population of Iraq to function as a demos after the American invasion in 2003, 
the level of social discord initially precluded this (due to a variety of factors, to which the 
invasion and occupation undoubtedly contributed). As efforts of nation building progress, 
the situation in Iraq will hopefully improve, but it should be clear that there are very real, 
factual constraints on whether a particular collection of individuals can function well in 
guiding collective decision making and facilitating action. The performative question 
about the demos takes those constraints seriously.  
In the remainder of this paper, we concentrate on this second, performative question, for 
two reasons. First, there are already well-established off-the-shelf membership criteria, 
such as affectedness and affectivity, by which we can answer the first, compositional 
question, whereas the analysis of the second question – that is, what functional 
characteristics a collection of individuals must exhibit to function as a demos – is less 
developed. Second, as we have seen, there may be alternative strategies for promoting or 
restoring congruence between different membership criteria – e.g., the identity-expanding 
and externality-limiting strategies – when the sets of individuals picked out by them do 
not coincide. The application of an appropriate performative criterion can help choose 
between those alternative strategies, as only one – but not the other – of these strategies 
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might be able to yield a collection of individuals that meets that performative criterion. 
As we have mentioned, the two variants of the performative approach reviewed above 
will provide useful inspiration for our task, but, in order to introduce the central idea, it is 
helpful to bring in the notion of group agency. 
A demos as a collection capable of democratic agency 
The capacity to make decisions and to take actions, as opposed to exhibiting mere 
behaviour, is one of the distinguishing features of an agent. Agency can be defined in 
thicker and thinner ways, and on some accounts even a device as simple as a thermostat 
can count as an agent, though of course not as a particularly sophisticated, let alone 
conscious one. For the present purposes, we define an “agent” thinly as a system which  
• has attitudes – which can be described as “beliefs” and “preferences” – on the 
issues it faces,  
• and acts (by making decisions or taking actions) in such a way as to “pursue” its 
attitudes – in particular, to satisfy its preferences, as far as possible, in accordance 
with its beliefs.26  
Humans, cats and dogs – and with a little stretch even thermostats – come out as agents 
under this definition, while rocks, armchairs and cars (without a driver) do not. A thesis 
that is increasingly receiving attention is that certain groups or collections of individuals 
can constitute agents in their own right, provided they are organized in an appropriate 
way.27 Corporations or cohesive multi-member courts may be the paradigmatic examples 
of group agents, taking attitudes on issues within particular domains and acting in 
accordance with those attitudes, but well-functioning states, which are particularly 
important for our present analysis, equally qualify, since they, too, take attitudes on a 
large range of issues and systematically pursue them, ideally on the basis of a democratic 
process. 
                                                 
26
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Intentional Stance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987). 
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 List and Pettit, Group Agency (op. cit.). 
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Of course, it would be preposterous to suggest that a demos, which is not the same as a 
state but at most an “ingredient” of a state, should be a fully fledged group agent. Even if 
a state, understood as the composite system consisting of a demos and a suitable set of 
institutions, might fit the definition of an agent, the demos by itself, without the relevant 
institutions, need not. What we do suggest, however, is that, in order to function as a 
demos, a collection of individuals must at least be capable of being incorporated into 
such a state-like group agent. Moreover, this must be possible through some democratic 
form of organization, rather than, for instance, only in an authoritarian manner. Thus the 
key condition for functioning as a demos is the following:  
Capacity for democratic agency: The collection of individuals in question has the 
capacity (not necessarily actualized) to be organized, in a democratic manner, in 
such a way as to function as a state-like group agent. 
It is important to emphasize that the reference to democratic organization does not make 
the use of this condition in characterizing a demos in any way circular. As we will see, 
the notion of democratic organization of a given collection of individuals can be 
understood entirely procedurally, without having to settle any prior question of whether 
that collection meets the conditions for a demos. In the next two subsections we say more 
about what the capacity for democratic agency means both theoretically and practically.  
However, the general idea should already be clear. By combining an appropriate 
compositional membership criterion for a demos with our performative condition of 
capacity for democratic agency, we obtain the following working definition of a demos: 
A “demos” is a collection of individuals, demarcated by the appropriate 
membership criterion, which is in principle capable of being organized, in a 
democratic manner, in such a way as to function as a state-like group agent. 
Being a demos under this definition does not imply that the relevant state-like agent 
already exists or that it will ever come into existence. Nor does it specify how extensive 
such a state-like agent could or should plausibly be – for example, whether it would be a 
full-blown state or something less encompassing. All it says is that the nature of the 
collection of individuals itself would be no barrier to the emergence of such a state-like 
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agent, even if there may still be other barriers. Intuitively, a well-ordered society – say 
the population of some stable democratic country – fulfils the condition of capacity for 
democratic agency without difficulty, while the population of a highly divided society in 
a situation of intractable civil war does not. Similarly, to give another example, the test 
for whether or not there exists a European demos (assuming that the European population 
is at least a candidate for a demos on the grounds of affectedness and possibly even 
affectivity) is whether or not the population of Europe can be democratically incorporated 
into a European state or state-like agent. Commentators are still divided on this question, 
but it should be uncontentious that the population of Europe is now closer to meeting this 
condition than it was, for instance, a hundred years ago. 
Of course, the present working definition still leaves a lot of questions open or 
underspecified – it is in this sense a definition scheme rather than a fully specified 
definition – but this should be seen as a virtue rather than a vice. Our first aim should be 
to get the big picture right, while still leaving some flexibility with regard to its technical 
details, so that disagreements about those details do not undercut that big picture itself. 
Assuming, however, that we have accomplished this first aim, our next step should be to 
zoom in on the relevant details, by trying to clarify what the capacity for democratic 
agency means in theory and what it requires in practice. We now address these questions 
in turn.  
What does the capacity for democratic agency mean in theory? 
According to the theory of group agency, a “group agent” is a collection of individuals 
which meets the conditions of agency, that is, roughly speaking, it has attitudes on the 
issues it faces and acts so as to pursue those attitudes, as defined above. To meet these 
conditions, the collection needs to have in place a certain “organizational structure”, 
which can be understood as the totality of rules, procedures and conventions by which the 
individuals coordinate their decision-making and action-taking.28 In the case of a state, 
the key group agent for our purposes, the organizational structure consists of the formal 
and informal institutions that underlie the state’s political and economic life. In the case 
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of a corporation, another familiar group agent, it is given by the relevant corporate 
structure, its procedures and organizational mechanisms. By contrast, a completely 
unorganized collection of individuals, such as the random collection of people who 
happen to be in the same subway carriage at a given time, does not usually meet the 
conditions of agency, unless they started organizing themselves in an appropriate way, 
thereby setting up the necessary organizational structure.  
The organizational structure of a group agent, particularly that of a state or other state-
like entity, may or may not be democratic. It is democratic at least in a minimal sense if it 
satisfies conditions such as Robert Dahl’s classic conditions of procedural democracy, for 
example political equality among the individuals organized by the given structure, 
effective opportunities for participation by these individuals, effective opportunities for 
developing an “enlightened understanding” of the relevant issues, for instance through 
certain forms of deliberation, and control over the relevant agenda of issues to be 
decided.29 More technically, we might distinguish between more and less democratic 
organizational structures by means of the formal conditions employed in social choice 
theory.30 Depending on which precise conditions we substitute into our working 
definition of a demos, we then obtain stronger or weaker versions of that definition.  
Importantly, as Dahl himself recognized, one can assess whether a given organizational 
structure meets such procedural conditions, independently of whether or not the 
underlying collection of individuals has been demarcated according to appropriate 
normative criteria. Thus it is entirely meaningful to say, for instance, that within its own 
institutional boundaries a given organizational structure counts as democratic, while we 
may still ask questions about whether those institutional boundaries are legitimate. 
We have already emphasized that a demos is neither by itself a group agent, nor 
necessarily part of an actually existing group agent. What, then, do we mean when we say 
that a demos must be capable of democratic agency? The capacity for democratic agency 
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 Robert A. Dahl, “Procedural Democracy,” in Philosophy, Politics and Society, 5th series, ed. Peter 
Laslett and James S. Fishkin, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979). 
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 E.g., List and Pettit, Group Agency (op. cit.). Axiomatic social choice theory goes back to Kenneth 
Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: Wiley, 1951/1963). 
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can imply either of two things: Either the collection of individuals is already 
democratically organized in such a way as to function as a state-like group agent – in 
particular, the resulting democratic state or state-like agent already exists – or it is 
capable of becoming so, that is, such a state or state-like agent could be brought into 
existence if the collection were given the appropriate democratic organizational structure. 
Only the demoi of well-functioning states or other state-like entities, say those of 
established democratic countries, fall into the first category. In the case of any other 
collection, we need to ask whether, if supplemented with an appropriate democratic 
structure, the collection would generate a state-like agent.31 
Roughly speaking, someone or something has the capacity to achieve X just in case there 
is a feasible set of circumstances (a “nearby possible world”, in technical terms), 
attainable from the actual circumstances, in which he, she or it achieves X. Applied to the 
present context, this means that a collection, say a particular population, which does not 
yet constitute a democratically organized group agent has the capacity of doing so just in 
case there is a feasible set of circumstances in which this collection is supplemented with 
a democratic organizational structure and through it functions as a state-like group agent. 
For example, since the beginning of European institutional integration, the population of 
the European Union has arguably moved in the direction of satisfying this condition – in 
the sense that the attainment of state-like agency through a democratic structure has 
become increasingly realistic – while any rapidly disintegrating society en route to civil 
war, such as the society of Yugoslavia in the period of its breakdown, fails to meet it. To 
be sure, there can be reasonable disagreement as to what criteria of feasibility to employ 
in making such judgments, but those difficulties are no different from the difficulties with 
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any other social-scientific use of “modal” concepts, such as the concepts of possibility, 
feasibility, avoidability, and so on. 
After these theoretical reflections on what the capacity for democratic agency means, we 
now need to ask what this capacity requires more practically. At this point, the insights 
from the existing two variants of the performative approach come into play. 
What does the capacity for democratic agency require in practice? 
We have noted that some groups or collections of individuals exhibit so much internal 
discord and disunity that any attempt to organize them democratically so as to achieve 
state-like agency would be likely to fail, while others are very well suited for this 
purpose. Which characteristics distinguish the one type of group from the other in 
practice? Based on the insights of the two existing variants of the performative approach, 
two characteristics stand out. First, for a group to be capable of supporting collective 
decisions – one central prerequisite of the capacity for democratic agency – it must be 
possible to ascribe coherent attitudes to it, which can serve as a basis for these decisions. 
And secondly, for a group to be capable of endorsing its collective decisions and taking 
the required coordinated actions – another key prerequisite of the capacity for democratic 
agency – the group must exhibit sufficient internal cohesion, in a sense to be spelt out 
further. Let us make both of these practical requirements more explicit, beginning with 
the first one. 
External coherence: It is possible to ascribe to the collection of individuals in 
question coherent collective attitudes (particularly, preferences) on the issues on 
which collective decisions are needed, where these attitudes are defined by a 
suitable democratic criterion. 
A paradigmatic example of such a criterion is the majority criterion, as advocated by both 
Locke and Rousseau, who argued, respectively, that “the act of the majority passes for 
the act of the whole, and of course determines as having, by the law of Nature and reason, 
the power of the whole”,32 and “the vote of the majority always obligates all the rest”.33 A 
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 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), bk. 2, ch. 
8.96. 
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more systematic defence of the majority criterion might invoke Kenneth May’s classic 
theorem, which states that when a group seeks to form an attitude on some binary issue – 
say, whether to accept or reject some proposition – the majority criterion uniquely 
satisfies four very basic and plausible conditions of procedural democracy.34 However, in 
some contexts, other criteria for the ascription of collective attitudes are conceivable as 
well. A jury’s attitudes, to give just one example, may be determined by a supermajority 
or unanimity criterion. Thus the appropriate criterion can clearly be group- and context-
specific.35 
To spell out the second practical requirement for the capacity for democratic agency, 
some preliminary discussion is needed. It may be tempting to interpret the requirement of 
internal cohesion as demanding a consensus among all group members on the relevant 
issues. Such a consensus, however, is certainly not necessary for a group to be capable of 
endorsing its collective decisions and taking the required coordinated actions. Groups 
exhibiting less than a full consensus can still succeed on both fronts, and as already 
noted, many generally recognized demoi exhibit a fair amount of internal pluralism. 
While certain destructive kinds of pluralism would be likely to undermine a group’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
33
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and later political writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), bk. 4, ch. 2. For further discussion, see List and Pettit, 
Group Agency (op. cit.), ch. 2. 
34
 First, it is open to all possible combinations of individual attitudes on the issue in question (“universal 
domain”). Second, all individuals have equal weight in determining the collective attitude (“anonymity”). 
Third, the criterion itself is unbiased between a positive and a negative attitude (“neutrality”). And fourth, 
the collective attitude is a positively responsive function of the individual attitudes (“positive 
responsiveness”). See Kenneth O. May, “A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for 
Simple Majority Decision,” Econometrica 20(4) (1952): 680-684; also Robert E. Goodin and Christian 
List, “A Conditional Defense of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem in a Restricted Informational 
Environment,” American Journal of Political Science 50(4) (2006): 940-949.  
35
 A full defence of any given criterion for ascribing collective attitudes is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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capacity for democratic agency, other, more benign kinds of pluralism pose no 
difficulties; indeed, they can be helpful, given the epistemic benefits of diversity.36  
To capture the fact that a certain degree of diversity within a group is entirely consistent 
with the capacity for democratic agency – and quite plausibly also beneficial – we can 
distinguish between two types of consensus or agreement: “substantive” and “meta-
agreement”, as defined in a moment.37 We suggest that the first of these two types of 
agreement is not generally necessary and typically too demanding, while the second is 
arguably closer to what is required for the capacity for democratic agency, at least when 
it is restricted to issues on which collective decisions are needed. However, a fully 
adequate analysis of what precise kind of internal cohesion in a group is needed for the 
capacity for democratic agency would require extensive empirical research, and so the 
present remarks are very tentative. 
Let us say that a set of individuals “agree substantively” on a particular issue if they hold 
the same attitudes on it. As we have pointed out, such a strong form of agreement is not 
necessary for a group’s capacity to endorse its collective decisions and to take the 
required actions – at least it is not necessary once we move beyond certain fundamental 
issues. By contrast, a set of individuals “meta-agree” on a particular issue if they agree on 
how to conceptualize that issue within some shared cognitive or normative space, while 
not necessarily agreeing substantively on it.38 A common conceptualization ensures that 
the individuals are able to rationalize their conflicting individual attitudes in a common 
way, which in turn enables them to endorse and enact certain compromise decisions that 
might otherwise be unavailable. The notion of meta-agreement can be made more precise 
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in various ways – and we can distinguish weaker and stronger versions of it – but what 
matters most for the present purpose is our strategy of defining a group’s internal 
cohesion not primarily in terms of substantive agreement among the group members, but 
primarily in terms of meta-agreement.39 
Internal cohesion: The collection of individuals in question is in sufficient meta-
agreement on certain issues on which collective decisions are needed – and, if 
required, in sufficient substantive agreement on some relevant fundamental matters.  
Obviously, a lot more needs to be said about how exactly this condition is to be 
understood, given the variety of ways in which meta-agreement can be defined and the 
variety of ways in which one might distinguish the issues on which meta-agreement or 
substantive agreement are needed from those on which they are not; thus the present 
formulation of the requirement of internal cohesion is only a first approximation. For 
example, one might speculate that substantive agreement is needed on (but perhaps only 
on) some fundamental matters, such as constitutional ones, and that meta-agreement is 
more important in the case of preferences than in the case of beliefs. For simplicity, we 
mainly focus on preferences in our present analysis, but this is not meant to reflect any 
judgment about the relative importance of preferences vis-à-vis beliefs. We can only flag 
these questions for further research here.  
As in the case of our general performative condition for a demos, the fact that the 
requirements of external coherence and internal cohesion are left somewhat 
underspecified should be seen as a virtue rather than a vice. It insulates the key ideas 
underlying our agency-based approach to conceptualizing the demos from disputes about 
its precise operationalization. While it is already a major challenge to sketch out the big 
picture correctly, filling in all the details would require a research programme well 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, to suggest some starting points, we devote the 
next section to a first simple operationalization of our approach.   
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III. A SIMPLE OPERATIONALIZATION 
So how can we operationalize the requirements of external coherence and internal 
cohesion? How we can we assess the extent to which a collection meets them? In what 
follows, we propose a first, very simple and tentative operationalization of both 
requirements in the case of the preferences held by the members of the collection, 
drawing on ideas from social choice theory.40 Roughly, to obtain a simple proxy measure 
of a collection’s external coherence, we ask whether its majority preferences satisfy 
standard consistency conditions such as “acyclicity”. And to obtain a similar proxy 
measure of the collection’s internal cohesion, we ask whether the individual preferences 
across the members satisfy certain homogeneity and structure conditions, which can be 
interpreted as observable indicators of the levels of substantive and meta-agreement on 
the issues in question. However, we should stress at the outset that the relationship 
between the requirements we want to assess and our proposed proxy measures is like that 
between a complicated medical condition and a simple diagnostic test. Although the test 
has a certain degree of sensitivity and specificity for the underlying condition, it is still at 
best a fallible indicator for it, which can corroborate but not definitively prove the 
presence of the condition. 
Operationalizing external coherence 
It is helpful to begin with a stylized example. Suppose we want to find out whether the 
world’s population has a coherent general will on what to do about climate change. For 
simplicity, suppose that there are three relevant policy options: 
 x: All countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 y: Only rich countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 z: No countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Now it is entirely conceivable that the world’s population falls into three subsets of 
roughly equal size. The members of the first subset, which may include, for example, 
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many Europeans, prefer x to y to z. The members of the second subset, which may 
include some of the world’s poor, prefer y to z to x. The members of the third, which may 
include the conservative global warming skeptics, finally, prefer z to x to y. With 
individual preferences like these, a majority prefers x to y, a majority prefers y to z, and 
yet a majority prefers z to x: an overall “cyclical”, and thereby inconsistent majority 
preference. This is an instance of Condorcet’s much-discussed “paradox”. 
When majority preferences are cyclical, they cannot coherently guide decisions. In our 
example, none of the options would command a majority over all the others – there is no 
“Condorcet winner” – and thus the question of what the group wants has no coherent 
answer here. If the world’s population is as divided in reality as in our simple example, it 
clearly fails to meet the test of external coherence.  
Generally, then, we propose to measure external coherence in terms of the absence of 
cyclical majority preferences. For any given set of options and any given combination of 
preferences across individuals, it is a yes-no question whether the resulting majority 
preferences are free from cycles. This would give us a first simple binary test of external 
coherence. However, when we look at more than one set of issues and perhaps at 
individual preferences within the same collection of individuals at different times and 
under different circumstances, we can take the infrequency of cyclical majority 
preferences as a continuous measure of external coherence. It is needless to say that this 
measure can – and ultimately needs to – be generalized further. 
How difficult is it for a collection of individuals to achieve external coherence in this 
sense? One influential body of theoretical work suggests that it is extremely difficult. 
Assuming no particular reason why individual preferences should be systematically 
constrained or correlated, one might expect all possible combinations of individual 
preferences to be equally likely to occur: the so-called “impartial culture” assumption. 
But if this is true, the probability of cyclical majority preferences increases as the group 
size and the number of options increases.41 The larger the collection of individuals and 
the more complex the issue in question, the less likely it then becomes that the group can 
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be externally coherent in the sense defined, and so the prospects for a global demos 
would be rather slim. William Riker notoriously used similar arguments to attack the 
notion of a general will per se, that is, even at a national level and not going as far as 
considering its possibility beyond state borders.42 
However, the assumption which leads to these bleak predictions – namely that of an 
“impartial culture” – is not only empirically unrealistic, but also constitutes what we may 
call a “knife-edge” scenario. It is unrealistic because there is no reason to think that, even 
in a collection as diverse as the world’s population, any logically possible combination of 
individual preferences is as likely to occur as any other. Surely, empirical constraints 
make some combinations of preferences more likely than others. And even more 
importantly, an ”impartial culture” constitutes a “knife-edge” scenario because, even for 
the slightest deviations from it, the probability of cyclical majority preferences can 
already drop significantly.43 Indeed, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence of 
cycles in real-world preferences, although, as far as we know, the relevant studies never 
consider preferences at a transnational level.44 
Given recent empirical and theoretical work, then, there is some reason to think that the 
threat of majority cycles is not as serious as it may appear at first sight, at least at the 
level of those groups that are candidates for demoi according to standard compositional 
criteria. But whatever our external coherence measure would say about the world’s 
population, we still need to consider our second, and perhaps more challenging 
performative requirement: internal cohesion.   
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Operationalizing internal cohesion 
As observed earlier, consistent collective preferences alone are not generally sufficient to 
guarantee that a collection of individuals is able to endorse its collective decisions and to 
support coordinated actions. This can be nicely illustrated by a slight modification of our 
example of preferences over policies to address global warming. Suppose, as before, that 
the world’s population is subdivided into three groups who prefer, respectively, x to y to 
z, y to z to x, and z to x to y. This time, however, suppose, that, as a result of differential 
population growth, one of the three groups, say the second one, has become an absolute 
majority, consisting of more than half of the world’s population. Unlike before, the 
majority preferences are then consistent, since they now coincide with the preferences of 
the enlarged subgroup. Qualitatively, however, nothing has changed in the structure of 
pluralism across the three groups. Intuitively, the world’s public opinion is as divided as 
it was before, even though the relative group sizes have slightly changed. Achieving 
coordinated action may be no easier than it was before. What this shows is that the 
existence of consistent majority preferences alone is not enough to tell us whether the 
group is internally cohesive in any meaningful sense. 
We have suggested that internal cohesion can be conceptualized in terms of substantive 
and/or meta-agreement on the relevant issues. How can we operationalize these notions? 
As defined above and now applied to the case of preferences, a set of individuals agree 
substantively on a particular issue if they hold the same preferences on it. Formally, we 
can measure the substantive agreement within a group by quantifying the diversity among 
its members’ preferences on the relevant issue. We can employ, for instance, a suitable 
measure of fragmentation to quantify how much heterogeneity there is in individual first-
choice preferences.45 The lower its value, the higher is the level of substantive agreement 
in a group. 
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But substantive agreement is neither necessary for consistent majority preferences, nor is 
it generally needed for achieving compromise decisions and coordinated actions, at least 
not once we move beyond certain fundamental issues. Perhaps a shared commitment to 
certain fundamental rights and duties – and thus a substantive agreement on some 
particularly fundamental matters – is required for the capacity for democratic agency. But 
when we set those fundamental matters aside, many generally recognized demoi exhibit 
only very limited substantive agreement. What appears to be a more plausible 
requirement of cohesion in a demos – over and above the mentioned “thin” substantive 
agreement – is a suitable meta-agreement. Recall that a set of individuals meta-agree on a 
particular issue if they agree on how to conceptualize that issue within some shared 
cognitive or normative space. In the case of preferences, we can measure the meta-
agreement in a group by quantifying the degree to which its members’ preferences satisfy 
a structure condition that reflects such a common conceptualization.  
The best-known such structure condition is Duncan Black’s notion of single-peakedness, 
though it is not the only one in the literature and we here focus on it just for simplicity 
(for a refined version of the present analysis, more sophisticated conditions may 
ultimately be needed).46 Black’s condition considers not whether the individuals 
substantively agree on the given options, but whether their preferences are rationalizable 
in terms of the same underlying “left-right” dimension. Crucially, the terms “left” and 
“right” can have any meaning, such as “urban” and “rural”, “secular” and “religious”, 
“pro-redistribution” and “contra redistribution”, and so on. A combination of preferences 
across a group of individuals is called “single-peaked” if the options can be aligned from 
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left to right such that every individual has a most preferred position somewhere on that 
left-right dimension with decreasing preference as options get more distant in either 
direction from it.  
The notion of single-peakedness has several appealing properties for our present 
purposes. It not only formalizes the idea that individual preferences are rationalizable in 
terms of a shared cognitive or normative dimension, thereby capturing the notion of a 
meta-agreement among the individuals, but it is also sufficient for consistent majority 
preferences. Black famously proved that whenever preferences across a collection of 
individuals are single-peaked, the resulting majority preferences are free from any cycles, 
and furthermore, the option that is majority-preferred to (or at least tied with) every other 
option lies at the “peak” of the median individual on the relevant left-right dimension. 
Single-peakedness therefore entails the satisfaction of our requirement of external 
coherence and ensures that whatever option is most preferred by the majority can be 
justified as a “compromise” by virtue of occupying a median position on a shared 
cognitive or normative dimension. 
So far, we have defined single-peakedness as a binary notion: Either the preferences 
across a group are single-peaked or they are not.47 More generally, we would like to 
measure single-peakedness in a continuous manner. We can do so by calculating the 
group’s “proximity to single-peakedness”, defined as the size of the largest subgroup 
within which preferences are single-peaked, divided by the overall group size.48 A value 
of one would correspond to full single-peakedness and thus a high level of meta-
agreement in the group; a value close to zero would correspond to the opposite case 
where the group is far removed from meta-agreement.  
                                                 
47
 In the stylized example of the world population subdivided into three groups, the condition is violated: 
No matter how we align the three options from left to right, one of the three groups will fail to have 
preferences that fit the pattern of single-peakedness. If, on the other hand, one of the groups were to change 
their views, transforming their preferences into those of one of the other groups, or even into the exact 
reverse of those preferences, the violation of single-peakedness would disappear. 
48
 List et al., “Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy” (op. cit.); 
Niemi, “Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality” (op. cit.). 
 29 
This simple measure not only captures an important aspect of a group’s internal cohesion, 
namely its level of meta-agreement (in a simple, one-dimensional sense), but it is also 
relevant to the group’s performance with regard to external coherence: the higher a 
group’s proximity to single-peakedness, the lower the probability of cyclical majority 
preferences. In the limiting case of a value of one, external coherence is fully guaranteed. 
Interestingly, Riker himself, despite his criticism of a populist conception of democracy, 
recognized the potential that a common conceptualization of an issue has in producing a 
coherent general will. Even more interestingly, he related the possibility of such a 
common conceptualization to conditions usually associated with the presence of a demos: 
“If, by reason of discussion, debate, civic education, and political socialization, 
voters have a common view of the political dimension (as evidenced by single-
peakedness), then a transitive outcome is guaranteed.”49 
These remarks not only support the idea that proximity to single-peakedness (together 
with a suitable index of a group’s substantive agreement on relevant fundamental 
matters) might be a good proxy measure for assessing a group’s internal cohesion and 
that such cohesion could be indicative of a demos, but they also point to a possible role 
that deliberation – “discussion, debate, civic education and political socialization” – 
could play in promoting such cohesion. We explore these ideas further in the next 
section. Before doing so, however, it is important to emphasize, once again, that our 
proposed simple operationalization of external coherence and internal cohesion is 
analytically distinct from our general agency-based approach to conceptualizing the 
demos, or from the idea that the capacity for democratic agency requires some form of 
external coherence and internal cohesion. While majority acyclicity and proximity to 
single-peakedness are particularly simple proxy measures of external coherence and 
internal cohesion in the case of preferences – a bit like a simple diagnostic test for a 
complex condition – other, more sophisticated measures may undoubtedly need to be 
developed for many contexts.  
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IV. TOWARDS A GLOBAL DEMOS 
With our conceptual apparatus in place, we can return to our original question of whether 
there can be a global demos. A comprehensive answer to this question is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but we can now see much more clearly what such an answer would 
require. We would need to determine, first, to what extent the world’s population already 
has a capacity for democratic agency, operationalized in terms of internal coherence and 
external cohesion, and secondly, which forces and mechanisms could move it in that 
direction, as a result of either intentional policies or unintentional developments. Given 
the enormity of this task, we limit ourselves to illustrating the implications of our 
approach in one particular policy area in relation to which the world’s population is, at 
least prima facie, a candidate for a demos – on affectedness and perhaps also affectivity 
grounds. The issue is the creation of a permanent judicial institution capable of 
prosecuting and punishing individuals who have committed genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity. Our brief analysis of the creation of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in the 1990s will suggest, first, that the external coherence and internal 
cohesion of the “international community” on this issue displayed a marked increase and, 
second, that this increase was due at least in part to processes of deliberation across state 
boundaries. This latter point is particularly important for the question of how a global 
demos might be promoted. It has been suggested that deliberation can help overcome 
difficulties such as majority cycles,50 and empirical evidence from domestic contexts, 
such as local and national Deliberative Polls, is consistent with this claim.51 But more 
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research is needed to ascertain if the same effect can result from transnational 
deliberation, where the Habermasian shared life-world is much thinner. Our discussion is 
meant to be a tentative and illustrative step in that direction.  
Probably only a small part of the world’s population is or will ever be a direct victim of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, but in this area Kant’s dictum that 
“the growing prevalence of a (narrower or wider) community among the peoples of the 
earth has now reached a point at which the violation of right at one place on the earth is 
felt in all places” appears particularly compelling.52 For instance, a 2007 poll of twelve 
countries in different parts of the world found that in all these countries a majority agreed 
that the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of military force 
to prevent severe human rights violations such as genocide.53 Apart from assuming a 
wide substantive agreement against doing nothing in the face of atrocities, however, it is 
difficult if not impossible to determine whether the attitudes of the world’s population on 
this issue – specifically on how perpetrators should be prosecuted and potential 
perpetrators deterred – are sufficiently coherent and cohesive to meet the performative 
criterion for a global demos. Obviously there has been no global referendum, but neither 
has the question been explored in any depth by transnational opinion polls such as the 
World Values Survey or the Pew Global Attitudes Project.54  For this reason, and for the 
sake of argument, we will assume that the positions taken by national governments are 
reasonable proxies of the attitudes of their populations. This assumption may be true in 
some cases but, of course, it is questionable in others. The illustrative character of our 
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discussion ensures that the inevitable discrepancy of government and public opinion does 
not invalidate our argument. 
Several attempts to create an international criminal court during the Cold War ended in 
failure. The post-cold-war years saw a renewed impetus on the issue, and in 1991 the UN 
General Assembly asked the International Law Commission to draft an international 
criminal court treaty. Formal discussions among UN member states took place in two 
sessions of an ad-hoc committee in 1995, six sessions of a preparatory committee 
between 1996 and 1998, and a diplomatic conference held in Rome in June and July 
1998. The meetings and the diplomatic conference addressed a wide and complex set of 
legal and political questions, but on the key issues three main positions were taken by the 
participating states, as discussed by Fen Osler Hampson and Holly Reid.55 The coalition 
semi-officially known as the Like-Minded group (LM) wanted a strong and independent 
court, which would be able to prosecute individuals without requiring the specific 
consent of the affected states or the UN Security Council (let us call this option Strong). 
The group of governments that Hampson and Reid refer to as the “conservative states” 
(CS) were concerned that an international criminal court would merely be yet another 
tool available to the great powers to encroach upon the sovereignty of weaker states, and 
thus preferred a weak court, or no court at all (we call this option Weak). A third group of 
governments, which Hampson and Reid call the “restrictive states” (RS), wanted to make 
the court subordinate to the UN Security Council and reserve to the latter the authority to 
trigger as well as to block the court’s action (call this option Subordinate). Although the 
statements made by state representatives in the forums in which the court was negotiated 
usually only pointed to the most preferred option, the ranking of the other options can be 
inferred with a reasonable degree of confidence from the arguments presented by those 
representatives and general considerations.56 The LM group would have preferred a court 
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dependent on the UN Security Council to a weak court, as the former would have been in 
a better position to apprehend and convict perpetrators of atrocities. Since a key concern 
of the CS was the possibility that the court could be manipulated by the great powers, 
they would have preferred a strong but independent court to a court that was essentially a 
tool of the Security Council. Finally, the RS would have preferred a weak court to a 
strong independent court, as the latter may have acted against their core interests, for 
instance by indicting their military personnel involved in peacekeeping or other foreign 
missions.  
Thus, when the “international community” started negotiating on the creation of an 
international criminal court, it displayed a low level of external coherence and internal 
cohesion. Not only were there major substantive differences over the court’s jurisdiction 
and independence, but the way the states’ preferences were distributed over the three 
main options reflected low levels of meta-agreement. In these conditions, negotiating a 
compromise solution was difficult and, even if the governments had resorted to voting at 
an early stage, it may well be that every main option would have been defeated.57   
However, when a vote on the final draft of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
was called on 18 July 1998, 120 governments voted for the Statute, 7 voted against, and 
21 abstained. The Statute created a strong court, which is closer to the preferences of the 
LM coalition than to the positions voiced by other states. What led to this outcome? First, 
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the conference chair was able to exercise a degree of agenda-setting power and propose a 
comprehensive package. Second, this package incorporated a few concessions to 
delegations that remained concerned about a strong and independent court and requested 
some safeguards. But arguably the main reason for the large majority supporting the 
Statute was the fact that over the years the LM position had gained many supporters, 
while the CS and RS positions had not. The majority of states that had not participated or 
clearly positioned themselves during the preparatory meetings came to support positions 
close to those of the original LM group.  
A number of scholars who examined the negotiation process emphasize the key role of 
deliberation in increasing support for the LM position.58 The LM group made little or no 
use of bargaining tactics such as promising rewards for support or threatening sanctions 
against opponents. On the other hand, pro-court officials, scholars and activists had 
repeatedly sought opportunities for open and trust-promoting dialogues with other 
delegates. Extensive deliberation also took place among officials of pre-existing and 
well-tested groupings, such as NATO, and in regional conferences organized by LM 
states and involving other governments in regions such as southern Africa, western 
Africa and central and eastern Europe.59 Particularly notable was the contribution of non-
state groups to the promotion of deliberation among state representatives. Members of 
several human rights NGOs, foundations, and professional associations participated in 
conferences, workshops and other events with government officials. NGO representatives 
were often legal experts who could provide authoritative views on various aspects of 
international criminal law. In 1995 the World Federalist Movement promoted a Coalition 
for an International Criminal Court, which grew rapidly to encompass over 800 
organizations by the start of the Rome conference in June 1998. Most of the 237 NGOs 
officially accredited at the Rome conference belonged to that Coalition. In addition to 
exercising pressure and increasing transparency, NGOs had a major role in shaping the 
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views of delegations from small developing countries and strengthened their ability to 
participate in the negotiations, for instance by offering legal advice, providing free 
translations of legal documents, and circulating information on the positions of other 
delegations.  
This brief analysis of the ICC negotiations offers an illustration of several points made in 
this paper. The existence of an effective international regime capable of deterring 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and of prosecuting alleged 
perpetrators even at a cost to national sovereignty, is arguably something that affects 
most people in the world. Worldwide abhorrence of such crimes may even be sufficient 
to stimulate global bonds of solidarity on that issue. The application of compositional 
criteria – almost certainly the criterion of affectedness but perhaps even that of affectivity 
– is very likely to identify the entire world population as the relevant candidate for a 
demos for the decision to establish a global legal regime against atrocities. However, if 
we take the governments’ positions as a proxy of citizen attitudes (an admittedly very 
imperfect indicator), it is doubtful whether the world’s population as a whole met our 
performative criterion for a demos when the creation of the Court was placed on the 
international agenda in the early 1990s. External coherence and internal cohesion, as 
defined earlier in this paper, were low globally in relation to this issue. But, crucially, this 
was not an inescapable situation. Not only did positions change, producing higher levels 
of external coherence and internal cohesion; this change was at least in part the result of a 
process of deliberation that was consciously promoted and stimulated. The United 
Nations provided a broad institutional framework that facilitated repeated communication 
and interaction, and this forum was supplemented by the activities of a large number of 
government officials, international civil servants, experts, and NGO representatives who 
created and used many opportunities for formal and informal, open and closed 
deliberation. The performative dimension of the international community was thus 
enhanced by design. Extrapolating from this illustrative case, a global demos, in the 
agency-based sense introduced in this paper, no longer seems completely unattainable, at 
least when it comes to certain issues of global concern such as the present one. 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
To recapitulate our argument, we have suggested that a good account of the demos must 
answer two questions. It must tell us, first, which collection(s) of individuals can be 
considered as candidate(s) for a demos for a given set of issues, and second, what 
functional characteristics such a collection must exhibit in order to facilitate good 
governance on those issues, that is, to guide collective decisions and to enable 
coordinated actions. Since there are good off-the-shelf proposals on how to answer the 
first, compositional question, we have concentrated on the second, performative one and 
proposed an agency-based approach to it. The central idea is that, to function as a demos, 
a collection of individuals must have the capacity to be organized democratically in such 
a way as to function as a state-like group agent. Metaphorically speaking, the collection 
must be “fit”, under the right democratic organization, either for statehood or at least for 
some restricted variant of it, even if it has not yet achieved that status. We have suggested 
that having such a capacity requires the collection to exhibit sufficient external coherence 
– in the sense that consistent collective attitudes can be ascribed to it – and internal 
cohesion – in the sense that its level of internal diversity does not prevent successful 
collective decisions and coordinated actions. However, we have tried to insulate this big 
picture from disputes about its operationalization by leaving many of its details open, 
proposing only a first simple and tentative operationalization in the case of preferences. 
Nonetheless, our approach should make the question of whether there can be a global 
demos tractable by clarifying what an answer to this question requires, both conceptually 
and empirically. As an empirical illustration, we have finally looked at one particular 
policy issue – the creation of the International Criminal Court – to suggest that the 
satisfaction of the identified conditions for a global demos is not completely out of reach 
and that it can be actively promoted through certain forms of transnational deliberation. 
Our case study is as modest, however, as our theoretical claims are ambitious, and we 
hope that this paper provides some useful conceptual resources for more comprehensive 
research. 
 
